Stranica 4 [4]
XeAe7e Decmber 32.
- page four =~
Nikolskoe on Ostrov Bering in the Komandorskie Ostrova. A third
base for Soviet submarines is Petropavlovsk on Poluostrov Kaméhatka,
Another base, but this one predominantly for larger ships of cruiser
types is in Korsakov on the “outhern part of Sa&halin Island. *he
number of Sa iet suimmarines at the three Northern basis alone has
been estimated in late October at sixty, which would corr:spond to
five flotillas at twelve submarines eache How much is lying in
Korsakov could not be learned and any estimate would be mere guess—
work. Still the best available intelligence proves huge activity
at that base too. There are furthermore indications that a submarine
base is being organizaed at Magadan. ‘he details on this are still
lackinge- Each one of these basis is furthermore coupled with air
basis for tig néw Tupelov 12 torpedo bombers of the Soviet naval
air force. *hese twin-engined torpedo bombers are considered by
Allied observers as being the best in theirlinese
rhere are furthermore gradual indications that several
Soviet unites stationed h&therto in ~urvpe, have been moved to the
Far-Easte This is not only true of land forces, but also of the Soviet
air forces
he recent report on Soviet rocket planes,=which to best
possible estimates will be the equal if not superior to the ones
produced by the West by 1955, - calls again the attention to the fact
that, besides Russian technicians, top German technicians too are
working on the Soviet projects. Among the most dangerous, one should
not Ingenéer DreA.Baade, who previously worked with Junkerse It &
Baade who has constructed the recently produced proto-type of a
Sovict jet beomber, which is the counter=part to America's B-47.
The test flights are now terminated and the new bomber is entering
mass production soon. Helping in this projett is Ingenieur Siegfried
Guenther, who originally conceived the heinkel 178 German jet planes.
“Summarizing all these rppoftts, one thing becomes absolutely
obvious to the observer and cannot be repeated too often: all the
moves of Stalin now are efforts to stall for time. They are made
in order to perfect a situation of military superiority for the
Soviet Union, which can come any time after the middle of 1955.
28.