Stranica 2 [2]
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XeAcTe December 52.
— page two ¬
Malenkov generatione These facts, more than anything that has been
said, forcefully confirs what has been repeatedly said in these
dispatches, namely that Malenkov is the chosen successor of Staline
The stories which are so amply circulated about triumvirates or so
on, Simply, are not born out by the plain faéés.
“he centralization of power thus points out to us, first of
all, that the succession of Stalin is solved, in @ manner in which
there seems to be no appeale Sut it alos indicates anodther most
important fact. “his is that for the first time in its history, the
Soviet Union had to adapt its organization to something imposed from
abroad = namely the American atomic superiority. Time and ag@in it
was pointed out in our dispatches that the military organization of
the Soviet Union had been adapted together with its industrial back¬
ground to the dangers of atomic attacks ‘he Soviet Union today, in a
military sense, is broken up into seven autonomous military units.
As far as possible, these military regions are industrially and
otherwise self-sufficient. Their borders determined by strategic
considerations, are not following the lines of the political divisions
of the USSRe But the fact of this economic and military decentraliza¬
tion has for the first time weakened the economic control of Moscow
over these regions. Under military command, autonomies are emerging
in which the paramount power of Moscow is no longer directly felt.
Increasingly it is the regional military command which assumes ever=
increasing powere From the military and economic field, this power
gradually branches out into the political field. The obvious dangers
of this situation are clearly understood on the Kremlin. It is clear
to the leaders that the vice=regal position given to high military
men is extremely dangerous for the fabric of the totalitarian regime.
But, the Kremlin understands this danger has to be accepted in regard
to the great threat of American atomic superiority. In order at
least to partly obviate to this danger, the Party had to be more
centralized than ever beforey and its regional branches more strongly
tied to Moscow directives than at any time in the past thirty yearse
This is then the second very important conclusion to be drawn from
the Soviet Party Congresse it is one whose far-reaching consequences
cannot be overestimated. Even inside Russia now, the Yarty becomes
the antagonist of the Army and there seems to be a tremendous opening
for Western political warfare.
NOTE: The aforementionéd consiferations are based on a”
direct report from Moscow, from the same source Which has already
in the past given us the best and most accurate informations. It
should be rated 1-Aé
In connection with the above-mentioned needs of Soviet
decentralization, it is interesting to note that in the estimate of
“oviet leaders, industrial and productive d-centralization in four
basic goods has now reached such.a point, that Soviet production
seems to be reasonably safe from atomic attack. This is in the field
of crude oil and refineries, steel, pig irom and coale in all —,