Stranica 3 [3]
XeAeSe November 52,
- page three ¬
3e Foreign policy: With its two pewer instruments - Army and
labor ‘nions a working against the country's economic interests,
Peron, as dictators before him, can only hope to maintain his
regime by playing the nationalistie cards, As long as his propaganda |
ean use foreign victories gained by Peron for his country, he will
be able to hold Argentina, These victories are not bloody ones, as
those of Hitler and Mussolings they are the triumph of "Peronistas",
of anti-US, nationalistic and "fascist" candidates in the other
Latin American countries, With the economie difficulties and the
dissatisfaction in Argentina itself¥, with the pressure coming from
Washington, these foreign poliey victories are Peron's only real
assets A set-back in that area would mean the beginning of his
ends
There is much speculation what would happen in Argentina, should
Peron disappear, As under all very personal and authoritarian
régimes, no other personality than the leader could develop. Peron
has no Sedéeswer among thé men who surround him, Those who best know
the situation agree that there would be at first a period of con¬
fusion where an Army officer is most likely to take over and to
introduce the essential steps leading towards normaley and a
certain economic freedom, This intermediate period might last about
two years - the time needed to restore economy, to devaluate then
re-evaluate the money, By that time a new leadership will have
shown and taken over,
mm em ¬
Peronism and communism,
As stated above, communists in Latin America are neither
pro nor contra Peron as such. Their policy is purely opportunistic;
they look for alliances, whereever it best suits their aim, vize
the sabotaging of the "common defense effort" as put forth by the
United States,
dice There are more than one instance that prove this communisti
stands
1, inside Argentina, - Confidential reports just received from a
high-placed Argentine wexumMkkkigesm observer state a most revealing
fact. it is known that two years ago, a split oweured in Argentine
communism. A dissident fraction came out with full wupport for
President Peron, while the main movement remained faithful to the
previous line of opposing the regime. Moscow however kept an
attitude of neutral expectation: it did not repudiate any of the two
fractions and it avoided attacking Peron or his regime, A few weeks
ago however, the Kremlin has decided on the way to chose (as it has
done for its parties in other Western countries). The leadership of
the orthodox communistie group in Argentine has started following the
example given by the dissidents two years agoe It is reported that
communist Party leader Codovilla has recently taken up secret contact
with a personality in Peron's closest surroundings. He has offered
his group's full support for the official Labor Unions and the use
of communistie means of propaganda in favor of Peronmyf and not - as up
to now a in opposition to the regime, Communists in Argentina is a
minority that has little ehance of ever reaching power. it is however
a very active group, whose offer of a secret alliance might prove very
at.