Oldal 4 [4]
- page four ¬
interior in 28 tribes. These natives are absolutely primitive,
hate the citizens, are of ct DE fe egy vigour and absolutely
uncon$pollable by the governem e They continue their tribal
wars, speak their languages, and are a hassa a | explosive
force if organized. Deprived of almost every right except for
the right to pay taxes, these natives are, in their pos tion
of inferiority, a potential great force at disruption, especially
4f they are approached via their primitive superstitions. The
control of their area by the Liberian governement exists in
name only. With a degenerate and corrupt group of 5% ruling all
the rest, conditions are ideal for the start of a subversive
movement e
The second reason of grave danger is the unbelievab¬
le corruption of the overstaffed administration and justices
Everytsing can be bought in Liberia, in most instances even the
court decisions. Under these conditions a heavily financed sub
versive movement would have every opportunity at purchasing
decisive complicities in governement, parliament, edministra=
tion and justice.
Finaly, despite the fact that everything in Liberia
has been made by the Whites, from the country itself to its
present progress, the hatred against the Whites in general is
very much alive and is kept go by the regime of President Tub¬
mann. Whites are held up to public losthing time and again,
and the Xenophobia is todsy one of the most potent weapons in
the country. Knowing this, the Communist agents are without
exception Negroes, who therefore enjoy a favourable prejudice
and will receive meny fecilities. In fact the Commnists count
very heavily on the anti-white feeling to farther their cause.
These three basic weaknesses of L.beria are the points
on which Moscow counts heavily. They render the country very
vulnerable to Communist action, and will show that way in a
very short while. The Communist offensiv4y as our observers
have authoritatively stated, ís completely ready to start.
And unforttinately L,beria is in its present conditions a po¬
tentially easy prey to the efforts of Moscow. It 48 very impor¬
tant that the Atlantic Powers should know this.
31.