. The second acute danger Ties: in the domestic situa¬
tion of the country. Dr. Kekkonen's Cabinet is in a rather unstab= —
le position. It is based on a coalition between the Socialists
and the Acrariens. This coalition has recently been torn by
the economic fight between the farmers on the one hand, the
{industrial and agricultural workers on the other. The main prob:
lem, now threatening the governement, 15 as follozs,. Recently
the farmers have rather neglected the production ef grains in
favour of the better payines cattle raising. Now tho farmers des
mand a raise of price for wheet and barley, arcuing that this
4a the incentive needed for raising production of grain and
nenee liberating the country, as in the past, from importang
these essential goods. the conflict is not so much oh the raises
4t 4a on who is to bear the tmpact of the dearer grains Dr.
Kekkomen would like to lay 4% on the grain commerce and the
milla. But the Socialists demand now, thart while these measures
should be taken to lower the income of the milis and merchants,
the farmers should not get the benefit of this measure, but
that the prace of grain should be cut for the urban consumer.
To this the agrerians can not agree. The quarrel is even more
increased by the diffisulties of the Finnish treasury, which
not only is short on foreign currency, but furthermore is over=
loaded by the needs to pay steeply rising unemployhent compen
setion.
As it is, the hone for a solution is renote at this
writing, and the danger of a crisis of the governement is greate
Most political observers fear it before the end of the year,
and tear it especially since there is no practical means of sol¬
ving it, as there is no possibility to visualize any new gover=
nement except through the present coalition, The other sclution
might only be new elections, and their outcome might render
the situation even more complicated.
: Because, and this is not the least perturbing of the
situation, the Communists are very encouraged by the trend of
affairs, Their following in the country, especially in the wor=
king magses is on the increase. And their leaders have confi¬
denes at creating soon a situation, in which unexpected events
might take place. As long as Finland was producing for the repa¬
rations, the Commmists were kept quiet by orders of Moscow;
they were not supposed bo perurb the production for Russsia.
Now they are given free hand, and a Soviet political support whi ch
46 more powerful potenthaily than ever before, This is the reason
why the Gommnist leaders hope to be able to create in 1953 a
situation, which would bring them back 4nto governement, and give
them the opp ortunity to create situations, in whieh they might
seize power without official Soviet action. Despite traditional
Finnish courage and patriotism, a situation of unperalelied dan ¬
ger is developing in the country e
U4,