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or at least limited its effectiveness, Taft had gainea the ini¬
tiative. He forced Eisenhower ti take stands on domestic issues,
henee to display his ignorance and contradittions - and to show
to the best advantage his own vast Imowledge. This has been a very
serious set-back for the Eisenhower campe
The best proof of this was the Maine Senatorial primary.
In Maine the sitting Senator was Mre Owen Brewster, a Taft suppor
tere Mre Brewster was admittedly one of the worst Senators in
Washington, a fumbling man with little ability, who had been in
very painful positions during his last term of office. It was a
‘ foregone conclusion that the Maine voters would retire him by a
large majority, especially since his opponent is a very able and
outstanding man, governor Payne, Still, while Payne, an Eisenhower
supporter, carried the state, it was by a surprisingly small
majority = and this in Eisenhower territory, against the weakest
man of the Taft crowd. A grave indication of the turn of popular
feelings ; ;
A second point of importance is that while the Republi¬
cans are manoeuvering to defeat each other, the administration
threw in some monkey-wrenches into the smooth running of both
machines, The first of these was the bombardment of the Yalu ah i
River dams and electric works in Korea, This was a direct blow to
keynoter General Mac Arthur, since the administration now can point |
out, that it is doing something very drastic on the Korean war si¬
tuation, something extremely popular with the American masses.
Tae second monkey-wrench was the move against Professor Owen
Lattimore, in order to steal Senator McCarthy's thunder, The ace
tion of the Department of State, cancelling Iattimore's passport,
was one to catch the public eye, While it certainly is not a lass
4ing decision - the basis for it is so flimsy, that in all justice
it can not be maintained - it was enough to capture the headlines
and hence to give the impression that the administration was doing
sonething against fellowebravellers.
&K third point is, that the strategy of the Taft forces
is now absolutely clear, Taft is fighting for a mock-out blow
on the first or the second ballott. Beyond that, he will have but
little left. Even his managers privately admit, that if he is
not in on the second ballott, his chances would be considerably
dimmed And on the best possible information, his first—ballott
nomination looks rather improbable. His secondary force is very.
weak = únless he can break into the Califomia Delegation, as his
planners are trying to do. Under these conditions, it looks to
this observer as if Taft would have to rely on a Blitzkrieg. He
can have but little endurance,
The fourth point is, that the Eisenhower strategy now