Oldal 2 [2]
OCR
XA TDot.52 o — page two very great modesty of the goals for the production of civilian goods. This is also important for the West to meditate, since it affords us a measure of the Soviet war preparations, as well as a certain sense of the Soviet timing. It is clear that the Soviets will, in raw materials production, reach the goaj according to their own decilara=tion in ten to fifteen years. By that time the Russian people, based on Stalin's promise will demand the fulfillment of the promise and the leaders will find themselves in a grave dilemma. They will not be able to deliver the goods. Hence it stands to reason, that they absolutely expect to be either in a war, or the masters of most of the globe by that time } otherwise they would not be foolish enough to promise something which they absolutely know not to be able to deliver. Without going into tedious rows of numbers, let us pick out as example of this situation two 4tems : the production of civilian ears and lorries on one hand, the production of tractors on the other. In the basic year of 1940 the USSR produced 147.000 cars and lorries. This rose by 1951 to #mmimano 405000 and is estimated at 486000 by 1955. This is the most interesting item, since, according to the fourth five year plan, the goal goal of 500000 cars and lorries should have been attained already in 1951. This shows us clearly the tremendous reconversion of Soviet industry even from essential civilian goods to war material. On tractors the USS produced 31000 ín 1940, 96000 in 1950 and should produce 114200 in 1955+ The modes ty of that essential civilian goal in relations to the great increases in steel output should 4ndicate the amount of production of tanks, since we know that most Soviet tractor factories are now busy producing tanks, meny Westerners have been inclined at taking comfort from the Soviet targets and achievements 4f they compared them with the tarcets and achievements of the United States and Western Surope.s This is a rather unfortunate approach, since the Western observers, almost without exception, are overlooking the fact that the Soviet total is far-frop complete, since to it should be added the produce tion of the East Buropean Satellite output, which, according to best available facts id far beyond the rise in Soviet production. Even today the industrial production of Eastern Burope is exceeding slightly the 40% of the Soviet production, which hence should be aded to it. And here again we mustreturn to Stalin's speach of February 9th, 1946. Besides putting up the millenium goal, Stalin also put up a goal to secure the Soviet Union " against any possibl e form of incidents and contingencies". If we add the present output of Eastern Europe to the Soviet total, we shall find that at the latet by the middle og 1954 this goal should be attained. By that time the common steel production of the Soviet ploe, without China, will reach the 65% of the American steel production of 1951, for examples With the funneling of steel simost exclusively to army supplies, it oa at.
